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Throughout history, countries from all over the world have devoted a considerable 
amount of resources to produce security. This evidence has motivated a growing 
number of studies that examine the determinants of the demand for military 
expenditure. Albeit the difficulty to develop a general theoretical framework and the 
inexistence of a standard empirical approach to model the demand for military 
expenditure, it is an important issue to understand which factors may influence the 
military expenditure demand function of a country. 
The aim of this dissertation is to find out the main variables affecting the 
Portuguese military expenditure taking into account a comprehensive set of economic, 
strategic and political determinants. For this goal, a military expenditures demand 
model is constructed for the period 1960–2010 employing the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) bound testing cointegration approach. 
The results suggest that the Portuguese defence spending is determined by the 
country´s economic performance, allies‟ defence speeding and security considerations. 
As far as the domestic political environment is concerned, the dominant ideology of the 
party in power seems to be insignificant, while the transition to a democratic regime is 
considered a relevant determinant with a negative effect on the military expenditure. 
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Ao longo da história, países de todo o mundo têm empenhado uma quantidade 
considerável de recursos para produzir segurança. Esta constatação tem motivado um 
número crescente de estudos sobre as possíveis variáveis explicativas da despesa 
militar. Apesar da dificuldade em estabelecer um quadro teórico de referência e da 
inexistência de uma abordagem empírica padronizada para determinar a procura de 
despesa militar, revela-se importante compreender quais as variáveis que influenciam a 
despesa militar de um país.    
O objetivo deste trabalho é aferir quais as principais fatores que poderão 
determinar a despesa militar de Portugal, tendo em conta um amplo conjunto de 
variáveis de natureza económica, estratégica e política. A prossecução deste objetivo 
assenta na construção de uma equação de procura para a despesa militar portuguesa, 
para o período compreendido entre 1960 e 2010, através de um modelo uniequacional 
ARDL. 
Os resultados obtidos sugerem que a despesa militar em Portugal é determinada 
pelo desempenho económico, pelo gasto militar de países aliados e por considerações 
relativas à perceção das condições de segurança. No que respeita à influência do 
ambiente político, a ideologia dominante do partido em funções no Governo surge como 
não significante, ao passo que a transição para um regime democrático é considerada 
uma variável relevante, com um efeito negativo sobre as despesas militares.  
 
Classificação JEL: H56, H41 
Palavras-chave: Portugal; Despesa militar; Modelo de Procura; modelo uniequacional 
ARDL   
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1. Introduction  
 
What drives the demand for military expenditure in Portugal? How is the military 
expenditure affected by economic, strategic and political factors?  
To answer those questions, this dissertation provides an empirical analysis of the 
Portuguese demand for military expenditure from 1960 to 2010 employing the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing cointegration approach  
Given the contemporary crisis scenario in Europe, and particularly in the Euro 
Zone, the Portuguese government has been applying a range of strategies to manage 
with the impact of the financial and economic crisis. The correction of imbalances in the 
public sector involves a fiscal consolidation process that requires the adoption of a 
comprehensive program of public spending cuts. Public expenditure reform motivates 
an important debate on the size and functions of the state. According to the National 
Defence Strategy Concept (Portuguese Government, 2013), security and national 
defence functions are not immune to fiscal consolidation measures. Therefore, a very 
important issue is how to cope the pressure on the defence budget. The present work, 
rather than focusing on particular consolidation measures and on the consequences of 
military cuts, aims to shed some light on the matter by providing a clear understanding 
of the Portuguese demand for defence. 
Economic Theory has been providing useful insights into the study of conflicts 
and peace. Thus, Defence Economics became a fertile ground for academic research 
motivating economists to explore researched fields such as the determinants and 
consequences of violent conflicts, the relationship between military expenditure, growth 
and development, the arms production and trade or the determinants of military 
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spending. As the majority of the countries all over the world devote a considerable 
amount of resources to produce security, it is well founded the interest of academic 
researchers and policy makers in determining the factors that influence the demand for 
military expenditure. 
There have been few previous studies on the determinants of the Portuguese 
military expenditure and the existing ones do not provide a satisfactory and 
comprehensive analysis, as they do not take into account the country´s historical and 
political specificities when modelling the demand for military expenditure.  
The estimation of a demand model exclusively for Portugal using a 
comprehensive set of economic, strategic and domestic political determinants is a new 
addition to the literature and is the main purpose of this dissertation.  
With the information obtained, we are able to identify the factors that may be 
understood as determinants of the Portuguese military expenditures. Thus, it would be 
possible to find a better alignment between the public resources allocated to the military 
and the economic, political and security environments. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 briefly traces the history of Portuguese defence policy and the 
involvement in multilateral security initiatives. Section 4 presents the data collected and 
used in the empirical analysis. The econometric methodology and the main empirical 






2. Literature review 
2.1. Theoretical background  
There is a wide range of literature examining the determinants of military 
expenditure. Albeit sharing the same starting question – what drive the military 
expenditure? – studies do vary in several aspects such as the theoretical framework 
considered, the empirical methodology used, the sample of countries under analysis and 
the time period covered.
1
 
Generally, the empirical works on the determinants of military expenditure can be 
grouped into four different conceptual approaches: Organizational Politics and 
Bureaucratic models, Military Alliances Theory Models, Arms Race Models and 
General Models of aggregate defence spending. 
The literature on Organizational Politics and Bureaucratic Models
2
  are supported 
in the notion that the military budget is used by decision makers to respond to the 
political environment and so the level of military expenditure is understood as the result 
of a complex struggle for power. Therefore, the models developed focus on the military 
budgetary process where interest groups (such as bureaucrats, politicians, the military 
institution and the arms industry) compete in order to optimize their own objectives. 
One main features of this approach, as suggested by Smith (1989) and Neira and 
Gonzalez (2008), is the “incrementalism”, so that, the complexity of the military 
budgetary process, together with the agent´s limited rationality, lead to inertia and to an 
incrementing behaviour of military expenditures. 
                                                                
1
 Studies on the determinants of military expenditure are reviewed by Hartley and Sandler (1990), Smith 
(1995) and, more recently, by Neira and Gonzalez (2008) 
2
 See Ostrom (1978); Cusack and Michael Don (1981); Majeski (1983) and  Rattinger (1975) 
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A second class of models, the Military Alliance Theory Models
3
, sought to 
analyse the economic dynamics of military alliances addressing issues such as the 
alliance size, the burden sharing and the sub-optimality of the military expenditure 
level. Since the seminal work of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), where the security and 
deterrence provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is considered as 
a pure public good from the perspective of an individual ally, this strand of literature 
have  been  extensively studied. Although the study of military alliances is closely 
related to the theory of public goods, the intense debate over the public good nature of 
military expenditure has motivated the incorporation of additional theoretical 
extensions.  
Another strand of literature, the Arms Race Models
4
, accounts for the effect of a 
rival country´s military expenditure as the major determinant of one country military 
spending. The arms race models reference work is Richardson (1960) who developed, in 
a Game Theory framework, a mathematical model defined by a set of differential 
equations. The key feature of this approach is that the level of military expenditure is 
determined by an action-reaction process. As pointed out by Dunne, Perlo-Freeman, and 
Smith (2008), these models are best suited to analyse situations in which countries are 
in conflict.  
Recent literature has focused on a more general approach based on the 
development of a comprehensive demand model for military expenditure taking into 
account a range of economic, political and geostrategic variables. Despite some works 
turn to ad hoc variables, the theoretical background for military expenditure demand 
                                                                
3
 Sandler (1993) review the literature about Military Alliance models 
4




models adapts the standard microeconomic formulation of utility maximization subject 
to a budget constrain so that this approach is also known as the Neoclassical Approach. 
Smith (1980) is a reference work for this approach and its model is the theoretical 
background of the present dissertation. The author assumed that a country maximizes an 
aggregate welfare function, W, depending on the civilian output, C, and on the level of 
security, S, i.e.: 
        .      (1) 
Security can be understood as a subjective confidence based on perception of 
threat of attack. In order to quantify the variable, the level of security is assumed to 
depend upon the level of military expenditure, M, conditioned on political and strategic 
factors Z: 
       .     (2) 
The social welfare function maximization is subject to the security function and to 
a budget constraint as follows: 
                (3) 
where Y is nominal aggregate income,    and    are the prices of real military 
expenditure M  and  output  C.  
By solving the maximization problem the  derived  demand  function for  the  
level  of  military  expenditure  can  be written as: 
               .    (4) 
The general models of aggregate defence spending popularity is essentially due to 
three features: first, it takes a comprehensive approach where, in a single equation, the 
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military expenditures is defined as a function of economic, political and geostrategic 
factors; second, this strands of research brought together some of the issues considered 
in the other approaches mentioned above by incorporating specific variables that allow a 
more wide-ranging  understand of military expenditures; third, it provides a satisfactory 
empirical analyses (Dunne et al., 2008). 
Depending on the author´s purpose and on the data availability, studies do differ 
in the sample of countries and in the time period covered. Some studies focus on a 
group of countries, employing cross-sectional or panel data techniques, in order to find 
out a common pattern or to explain the differences in military expenditures across 
them
5
. Alternatively, there are studies that focus on individual countries performing a 
time-series analysis, generally taking into account the country´s historical and 
institutional information
6
. The time period under analysis is commonly determined by 
the data availability and, in some cases, is by itself a prominent variable under analysis 






                                                                
5
 For Less Developed Countries see Dunne, Nikolaidou, and Mylonidis (2003); Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 
(2003b); Dunne et al. (2008). For European countries see Dunne et al. (2003); Nikolaidou (2008) 
6
 Examples of case-study works are: Solomon (2005) for Canada; Abdelfattah, Abu-Qarn, Dunne, and 
Zaher (2013) for Egypt; Kollias and Paleologou (2003) for Greece; Batchelor, Dunne, and Lamb (2002) 
for South Africa; Sezgin and Yildirim (2002) for Turkey; Smith (1980) and Hartley and MacDonald 
(2010) for United Kingdom. 
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 Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003), for instance, attempts to evaluate the driving forces behind military 
spending in developing countries by comparing a period during the Cold War with the period afterwards. 
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2.2. Literature on the determinants of military 
expenditure 
 
In the Defence Economics literature several factors have been put forward as 
potential explanatory variables for military expenditures. Nevertheless, there is little 
consensus amongst the majority of empirical studies regarding the definition, 
significance and direction of the effect of those variables. Table VI (see the appendix) 
provides a summary of the empirical evidence on the determinants of military 
expenditure. 
The variables considered in most studies as key factors for determining the level 
of military expenditure can be broadly grouped into three categories: economic, 
strategic and political variables. In this section, the empirical literature on military 
expenditure will be reviewed following the above categories. Variables can also be 
grouped into internal and external according to the country´s influence on them. As 
suggested in Figure 1, the variables categorization is not straightforward.   
 
Figure 1: Summary of the determinants of military expenditure  
8 
 
2.2.1. Economic determinants 
 
Income  
The causality nexus between income and military expenditure has been 
extensively studied in the Defence Economics literature. The impact of defence 
spending on economic growth is a controversial issue, beyond the scope of this work, 
that has stimulated an intense debate among economists since the seminal work Benoit 
(1978). On the other side, income is commonly considered as a key explanatory variable 
as it is included in practically all the models of demand for defence expenditures, 
although there is a lack of unanimity on its significance.  
Under the light of Public Finance Theory, national defence is considered a 
standard public good and the level of military spending is expected to be positively 
related to income. In other words, higher income levels tend to generate higher military 
spending so that income can be easily understood as a country´s ability to pay for 
security.  
Most studies use either GDP or GNP as a proxy for income. Batchelor et al. 
(2002), investigating the demand for South Africa defence expenditure, Kollias and 
Paleologou (2003), for Greece, and Nikolaidou (2008), for 15 EU member states, 
evidence the important role of income in determining military expenditure. Controversy, 
Dunne et al. (2003), for Spain and Greece, and Solomon (2005), for Canada , reported 
income as insignificant at least in the long-run, while Dunne et al. (2008), studying a 
sample of Less Developed Countries, and Hartley and MacDonald (2010), for United 






Population is introduced into the demand function in order to capture a possible 
size effect. Regarding the non-rivalry of defence, military expenditure is unlikely to 
increase as population increases. This idea is supported by studies that evidence the 
insignificance of population as explanatory variable such as Solomon (2005) and 
Kollias and Paleologou (2003). Additionally, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003a, 2003b) 
and Dunne et al. (2008) found that population has a significant and negative impact on 
military expenditure suggesting that a large population provide intrinsic security by 
itself, so that small countries, who cannot rely on a large army, have to spend more on 
high technology armaments.  
 
Openness of the economy 
Rosh (1988) is the first author to address the possible relationship between a 
country's incorporation into the world economy and its degree of militarization. The 
author starts by hypothesizing that countries highly integrated in the global economy 
would find it easier to obtain financial support to arms purchase, leading to a higher 
military expenditure.  However, in a time series model, he finds out a negative 
relationship between share of trade (exports plus imports over GDP) and military 
expenditure stating that “the negative relationship exhibited within countries has 
overwhelmed the positive relationship exhibited across countries” (Rosh, 1988, p. 691), 
thus concluding that, controversy to the initial hypothesis, as a countries become more 
involved in the world  economy their policymakers begin to  perceive greater benefits 
from not engaging in military conflicts . 
10 
 
The economic openness ambiguity as explanatory variable for military 
expenditure demand is illustrated in Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b), where trade has 
a positive and significant effect in a dynamic panel specification, although in the static 
fixed effects model it is also significant but presents a negative sign.  
 
Government expenditures 
The impact of government expenditures on military expenditure can be analysed 
in two perspectives. By one hand, the share of government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP may be used to account for the fact that the military will likely benefit from 
high government expenditure by itself. By another hand, researchers often use non-
military government expenditures as an explanatory variable to account for the 
opportunity cost of military expenditure.  Dunne et al. (2003), for instance, found a 
negative trade-off between non-military and military expenditure. 
 
Lagged military expenditure 
Many studies include a lagged military expenditure variable among the 
explanatory variables in order to capture the incremental inertia effect which is, as 
stated above, the main characteristic of Organizational Politics and Bureaucratic 
Models. The autoregressive nature of military expenditure is revealed in several studies, 
such as Abdelfattah et al. (2013), Solomon (2005) and  Sezgin and Yildirim (2002), and 
besides being explained in terms of bureaucratic inertia it may be associated with 
intangible reasons, such as tradition or national pride (Markowski & Tani, 2005), or 
may be due to hangover from previous expenditures or commitments to programmes 
(Dunne and Mohammed, 1995). 
11 
 
2.2.2. Strategic determinants 
 
Armed Conflicts 
The existence of an armed conflict is a relevant determinant of military 
expenditure. To capture a country‟s participation in a conflict, either external or 
internal, dummy variables are commonly used in order to identify the years when it 
occur. It is unanimously accepted the positive significance of conflict variables as 
explanatory variables. Batchelor et al. (2002) reveal a positive impact of the 
involvement in Angola War on South Africa´s military burden, and Dunne et al. (2008), 




As a member of a military alliance, a country is committed to cooperate with 
allies on defence and security issues and, consequently, will get benefits resulting from 
the collective production of a public good such as defence. Therefore, and despite the 
existence of a specific approach that focus on alliance issues (the previously mentioned 
Military Alliance Theory Models), several works include alliance‟s military burden as a 
potential determinant in order to account for the spill-in effect. 
Hartley and MacDonald (2010) and Solomon (2005) show, for UK and Canada 
respectively, positive spill-ins from NATO, concluding that each country under analysis 







Threats may be understood in a similar way to spill-in effects. Typically, a threat 
is represented  by the military expenditure of a country considered as an enemy, or a 
potencial enemy, for the country under analisys. As an example, Sezgin and Yildirim 
(2002) find evidence that Turkish defence spending is positively influenced by Greek 
military expenditure, while Kollias and Paleologou (2003), by its turn, find the same 
evidence to Greece regarding the Turkish military expenditure.  
 
Security Web 
The security web idea was develop by Rosh (1988) as an attempt to look beyond 
the arms race models by establishing a broader concept comprising external security 
issues. A country´s security web is then defined as all the countries (allies, enemies or 
neutrals) that are able to affect significantly its security. Rosh emphasizes the 
geographic proximity and, calculating the degree of militarisation of a nation‟s security 
web by averaging the military burdens of neighbour countries, finds a significant and 
positive effect of security web on military expenditure.  Following  Rosh´s definition, 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b) also find out a significant and positive effect 
associated with the security web variable. 
 
2.2.3. Political determinants 
 
Political regime  
Some authors have studied the effect of political regimes on military spending.  It 
is widely found that democratic countries spend less on the military than non-
13 
 
democracies. On the contrary, autocracies or states with a military government are more 
likely to allocate more resources to military purposes. 
Many studies include a measure for democracy when they run military spending 
regressions with most of them revealing that a more democratic regime has a significant 
negative effect on military spending (Dunne & Perlo-Freeman, 2003a; Dunne et al., 
2008; Sezgin & Yildirim, 2002). A recent paper of Albalate, Bel, and Elias (2012), 
emphasizing the institutional determinants of military expenditure, show that 
presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defence, whereas 
its interaction with a majoritarian electoral rule reduces the defence burden. 
 
Ideology of the government  
In many countries the domestic political environment depends on the party in 
power, so that it´s political agenda may act as an influent determinant of military 
expenditures. In a case study for the United Kingdom, Hartley and MacDonald (2010) 
found that, albeit the lack of significance, the variable representing the party in power 
hints at higher defence spending by the Conservative governments than Labour 
governments. 
Kollias and Paleologou (2003), emphasizing the incorporation of variables that 
reflect the domestic political changes in Greece, show evidence that changes in the 






2.3. Literature on the determinants of Portuguese 
military expenditure  
 
There have been few previous studies on the determinants of the Portuguese 
military expenditure. Probably, the first study on this subject was done by Barros and 
Santos (1997) who carry  out  an  empirical investigation in order to assess the 
economic effects and the determinants of military expenditure in Portugal from 1950 to 
1990. As far as the military expenditure determinants are concerned, the authors 
regressed the military expenditures on five variables: lagged military expenditures, 
GDP, population, a dummy variable representing the party in power (0=left wing party; 
1=right wing party) and a dummy variable assuming 1 in a war situation. It was found 
that only the GDP and the trend variable coefficients were significant both with a 
negative sign. One limitation of this work, as noted by the authors, is the fact that it was 
not included in the model a strategic variable such as the military expenditure of NATO.
  Using a cointegration Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach, Dunne 
et al. (2003) estimate military demand equations for Greece, Portugal and Spain over 
the period 1960-2000. Results showed that output has a positive and significant 
influence on the Portuguese military expenditures. On the other hand, non-military 
expenditures and a dummy variable representing democracy have a negative and 
significant influence, both on the short and long run. NATO military spending has a 
positive effect that is only significant in the short-run and there is a positive effect of 
trade balance that is only significant in the long-run. Population is revealed as not 
significant variable. 
Following the previous work, a study conducted by Nikolaidou (2008) brings 
evidence on the determinants of military expenditure for each one of the 15 core 
15 
 
European Union countries over the period 1961-2005. The author find evidence 
supporting that Portugal is a follower of the United States and of the European NATO 
countries. Moreover, income shows a positive and significant effect on military 
expenditure. Population reveal a negative and significant effect suggesting, according to 
the author, that the public good effect of defence is verified. The non-military 
expenditures and the economic openness variable reveal no significance. This work, as 




3. Contextual setting: Portuguese defence policy and 
military expenditure trends 
 
The present section briefly traces the history of Portuguese defence policy and the 
involvement in multilateral security initiatives. 
In a general and summary way, as indicated by Telo (1998b), along its history 
Portugal has had four essential security concerns: (i) the defence of land frontiers in 
order to maintenance its sovereignty on the Iberian Peninsula, (ii) the participation 
effort in military alliances, (iii) the protection of its colonial empire and its communities 
all over the World and (iv) the support of the regime in power. Thus, the Portuguese 
military policy definition was always a combination of those security concerns with 
each one of them being more stressed according to the specific historical context. 
 






























1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Data source: INE
Portuguese military expenditure (constant 2009 EUR)
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Despite being a founding member of NATO, since 1949, the contribution to the 
alliance was secondary and only marginal for more than two decades. After 1959, the 
defence of the colonial empire became the main topic in the Portuguese foreign and 
military policy agenda. Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony 
in Africa and was one of the last to leave the African continent. From 1961 to 1974 the 
Portuguese Armed Forces conducted a counterinsurgency campaign to retain control 
over its African colonies. The conflict is known as the Portuguese Colonial War or the 
Overseas War. In April 1961 starts the insurrection in the northwest of Angola, in 
December of the same year Portugal lost its Indian possessions, in 1963 a new war front 
was opened in the former Portuguese Guinea (known as Guinea-Bissau since 1974) and 
in 1964 a third battlefront starts in Mozambique.  
The war effort was tremendous, especially considering the territorial dimension, 
the population
8
 and the poor economic development of Portugal. The Portuguese 
Colonial War was characterized by (i) its long duration (ii) the far distance between the 
mother country and the three theatres of operations (Angola, Guinea and Mozambique); 
(iii) the increasing civil mobilization and (iv) the substantial military expenditure 
growth. In 1968, the military burden (military expenditures as a percentage of GDP) 
was around 6%, the ratio of military spending to total central government spending was 
more than 40% and, according to Ramos, Sousa, and Monteiro (2009), the military 
personnel accounts for more than 150.000 soldiers. 
The Revolution of the Carnations, on the 25th of April 1974, put an end to the war 
in Africa and to the Estado Novo right-wing authoritarian regime heralding the 
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installation of a democratic regime. After 1974, a major structural reorganization began 
in the Portuguese military structure. The two main outcomes of that reform were the 
considerable military down-sizing, performing the transition to a smaller peacetime 
force, and the strategic commitment to support the NATO effort in the defence of the 
West in response to the perceived threat represented by the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact. 
As pictured in Figure 2, Portugal had a high military burden for the years prior to 
1974. Since then, and after a dramatically decrease in the following years (the military 
expenditure was reduced by 29% in 1975 and 24% in 1976), the military burden has 
been kept at relatively low levels (less that 2% of the GDP). 
 









1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Data source: INE and World Bank
Portuguese military expenditure as percentage of GDP
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 The end of the  Cold War induced, during the 1990´s, a reform process in the 
Portuguese armed forces in order to adapt the military to a new international strategic 
environment (Telo, 1998a). That reform led to the professionalization of the military
9
 
and to the progressive military downsizing, with the reduction of both the military 
personnel and the military burden.  According to Duque (1998), the personnel reduction 
was from 72.000 soldiers in 1989 to 46.000 in 1997, the military expenditure as a GDP 
share was reduced from 2,2% in 1990 to 1,4% in 1997 and the military expenditure 
share in the central government expenditure was reduced from 6,1% in 1990 to 3,3% in 
1997. 
From 1988 to 2009, the defence budget was increased by an annual average of 
approximately 1% in real terms despite presenting a variable pattern between 2 and 2.5 
million euro (2009 EUR). Considering the military expenditure time series under 
analysis it is important to notice that the military expenditure reached a high level in 
2010 (an increase of 36.21% when compared to 2009) because the Portuguese Navy 
sub-surface fleet has seen a considerable improvement with the acquisition of two new 
submarines. 
Nowadays, the objectives of the Portuguese defence policy are to guarantee the 
national independence, the integrity of the territory, the freedom and security of the 
citizens and the safeguard of national interests, as well as, in the scope of a cooperative 
security, the active participation in providing international security, in particular, in 
international crisis management missions of Humanitarian and Peace-keeping nature. 
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 Over the 1990s a series of laws reduced the age of conscription and reduced the duration of service. In 
2005, peacetime conscription ended and the Portuguese military became an all-volunteer force open to 
both men and women (Card & Cardoso, 2012) 
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4. Data sources and descriptions 
 
The data used in this dissertation are annual observations from 1960 to 2010 and 
come from several sources. The economic evaluation was conducted in 2009 constant 
prices.  
Data on the Portuguese military and non-military expenditure were collected from 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE). The expressed military expenditure corresponds 
to the defence function expenditure according to the Classification of the Functions of 
Government. The non-military expenditures were obtained by subtracting the military 
expenditures to the total central government expenditures.  
The allies‟ countries military expenditure data were obtained on request from 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and all the series in 2009 
million USD were converted to 2009 million EUR by the relevant 2009 exchange rate. 
NATO founding members military expenditure excludes the military expenditure of 
Portugal and United States of America. Thus, the countries considered are Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and 
United Kingdom. 
Data on population, trade, GDP (in current EUR), GDP deflators and exchange 
rates were collected from the World Development Indicators 2012 database from the 
World Bank.  
To obtain a characterization of the government´s ideology it was used the 
Database of Political Institutions from the World Bank. Therefore, Right (right=1) 
stands for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic or right-wing, 
21 
 
while Left (left=0) stands for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social 
democratic, or left-wing  
The variables used in the estimation are summarized in Table I. 
Table I: Data summary 





10⁶€ 2169.52 514.28 886.35 3480.66 
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10⁶€ 27108.28 19867.74 2686.79 62792.37 
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10⁶€ 318797.80 64051.82 236823.50 494607.70 
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Ideology of the 
party in power  









dummy 0.61 0.49 0 1 - 




5. Econometric methodology 
 
5.1. Model specification  
The demand model developed in this section draws upon the Neoclassical 
framework as defined in Smith (1980).  As mentioned in Section 2, a country is 
represented as a rational decision-maker maximizing a national welfare function, 
depending on security and economic variables, subject to a security function and a 
budget constrain. As it is assumed that the security function depends, among other 
factors, on military expenditure, by solving the maximization problem the demand 
function for military expenditure is then derived. It follows that the demand for a 
country‟s military expenditure can be modelled as expressed in equation (4). 
The lack of data on civilian and military prices is a serious difficulty for the 
estimation of a conventional demand function. Indeed, under the light of the 
neoclassical theoretical framework, the exclusion of the relative price variable may 
cause a serious specification error. However, it is important to notice that GDP deflator 
is easily assumed to include price variation in the military sector. Therefore, most 
empirical studies exclude the civilian and military relative prices from the demand 
equation and simply use the overall deflator.  
Given the previous considerations, the equation that best describes the 
determinants of Portuguese military expenditure should incorporate economic, strategic 
and political effects.  For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the demand for 




                                             
                                           . (5) 
 
The  variables  were  selected  in  such  a  way  that  diverse  dimensions  of  the  
determinants  of  military expenditure could be analysed. 
This model considers five key economic variables.  GDP is the real gross 
domestic product and evaluates the effect of income, so that a positive coefficient may 
be understood as military expenditure being a normal good while, on the contrary, a 
negative coefficient may be understood as military expenditure being an inferior good.  
      is the lagged military expenditure and is introduced  to  account  for any 
bureaucratic inertia. NME is non-military expenditure and allows evaluating the 
existence of opportunity costs if a negative sign is observed. TRADE is defined as the 
ratio of imports plus exports over GDP and estimate the effect of the economic 
openness. POP is the total population and is used to measure the public good effect, so 
that a negative coefficient can be associated with the public good effect of defence. 
This model considers the role of strategic determinants by distinguishing between 
the response to the military expenditure of USA and the response to the military 
expenditure of others NATO allies. There are two reasons to consider the specific effect 
of USA military expenditure. First, the USA is the world's largest military spender and 
remains the only NATO member capable of sustaining a large-scale military operation. 
Second, as suggested by Markowski and Tani (2005), the US military expenditure can 
be understood as a proxy to measure the index of global instability.  
The NATO variable aggregates the military expenditure of NATO allies. It must 
be noticed that not all the members of NATO were used so that only the founding 
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members are considered with the exclusion of Portugal, the country under analysis, and 
the USA, treated in a separate variable. The member countries that joined the coalition 
later than 1960 were excluded in order to avoid the military expenditure increase due to 
enlargements. Greece and Turkey, despite the first two nations to be part of NATO‟s 
first enlargement in 1952, are not considered because their particular security issues that 
may distort their respective military spending. Germany is not included because, 
although the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955, only in 1990, with 
the reunification of Germany, NATO grew to include the former country of German 
Democratic Republic. 
Additionally to the strategic variables mentioned, the WAR dummy variable is 
introduced in order to capture the effect of the Portuguese Colonial War from 1961 to 
1974, taking the value of one during the conflict. Having in mind that, in 1974, the 
Revolution of the Carnations heralded the installation of a democratic regime, it is 
straightforward to understand the WAR variable with an additionally political meaning 
as it incorporate the effect of the previous authoritarian regime. 
In an attempt to capture the effects of domestic political considerations a dummy 
variable for the ideology of the political party in power is included.  The PARTY 
variable takes the value one when the government is formed by parties that are defined 
as right-wing and takes the value 0 when formed by parties that are defined as left-wing. 
As stated in chapter 4, the Portuguese military expenditure in 2010 increased by 
36.21% when compared to the previous year. Considering this outlying observation the 




5.2. Estimation method 
 
The present work follows the most recent literature on the determinants of 
military expenditure and estimate the demand model by employing the bounds testing 
approach to cointegration within an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) framework 
as develop by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001). 
It is important to note that there is no standard methodology for conducting the 
analysis on military expenditure demand function. Thus, several alternative methods 
have been applied in empirical studies. Nevertheless, the ARDL approach has gained 
popularity over recent years and its adoption for empirical analysis can be found, not 
only in the field of Economic Defence, but rather in a wide spectrum of economic 
works. 
In order to understand the popularity of the ARDL approach it is important to bear 
in mind the limitations commonly associated with alternative modelling methodologies. 
For instance, some studies have used simultaneous-equation estimation procedures, 
especially in Arms Race models and in Military Alliances Theory Models, where the 
military spending of countries are jointly determined. However, simultaneous equation 
methods have shortcomings that have been widely criticized, such as the division 
between endogenous and exogenous variables that are not always clear in many 
empirical models. In other instances, studies have applied single equation estimation 
procedures for the demand for military spending and have employed different 
cointegration techniques such as the Engle–Granger two-step procedure (see Dolores 
Gadea, Pardos, and Pérez-Forniés (2004) for NATO countries) or the Johansen 
maximum likelihood approach to cointegration (see Solomon (2005) for Canada). These 
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approaches to cointegration assume that the variables under analysis must be stationary 
and, therefore, require testing for unit roots and the use of differenced variables in case 
of non-stationarity. However, the first differences of the level variables may remove 
long-term information. Additionally, the cointegration estimation based on vector 
autoregressive (VAR) modelling is problematic when the number of variables 
considered is large due to the degrees of freedom considerations.  
The ARDL approach is more suitable for this study than the above alternative 
approaches and the main reasons for using this procedure are as follows.  
First, the ARDL procedure can be applied regardless of the stationary properties 
of the variables in the model. As shown by Pesaran et al. (2001), this methodology 
yields consistent estimates of the long-run coefficients that are asymptotically normal 
irrespective of the underlying regressors are I(0) or I(1).  
Second, according to Pesaran et al. (2001) the use of the ARDL model for the 
estimation of level relationships suggests that, once the order of the ARDL has been 
recognised, the relationship can be estimated by OLS.   
Third, ARDL allows to  describe  the  existence  of  a relationship  in  terms  of  
long-run  and  short-run  dynamics  without  losing  long-run  information. Contrary to 
the VAR frameworks, the number of variables in the regression model can be large.  
Finally, as demonstrated by Pesaran and Shin (1999), the small sample properties 
of the ARDL bounds testing approach are superior to that of the traditional Johansen 
cointegration approach, which typically requires a large sample size for the results to be 
valid. In particular, Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the ARDL approach has better 




A general ARDL       model, with         , takes the following form: 
                   
 
                  (6) 
where        and          are polynomial lag operators, with maximum lag of   and 
   respectively 
                 
       
     (7) 
                      
         
     (8) 
and    is the dependent variable,     are exogenous variables,    is a     vector of 
deterministic variables (such as the intercept term, the deterministic time trend, dummy 
variables or exogenous variables with fixed lags),   is the lag operator and     is a white 
noise error.  
An ARDL model can be rewritten in an error correction form as follows: 
                         
 
   
               
    
   
             
    
   
 
   
    
(9) 
where   is the first differences operator and the error correction term is defined as:   
              
 
           .    (10) 
According to Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001), the ARDL 
procedure involves two stages. 
The first stage is to test the existence of a long-run relationship among the 
variables and consists in testing the cointegration between    and    . It is tested through 
the OLS estimation of equation (9) and by computing the F-statistic for the joint 
significance of the coefficients of the lagged levels variables (i.e. to test if the 
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coefficients of      and       do not equal zero jointly). The F-test has a non-standard 
distribution which depends upon; (i) whether variables included in the ARDL model are 
I(0) or I(1); (ii) the number of regressors; and (iii) whether the ARDL model contains an 
intercept and/or a trend. The two sets of critical values, reported in Pesaran et al. (2001),  
provide critical value bounds for all classification of the regressors into purely I(1), 
purely I(0) or mutually cointegrated. If the F-statistic  exceeds  the  upper  critical  
value,  we  can  conclude  that  a long-run  relationship  exists.  If the F-statistic falls 
below the lower critical value, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
A value of the F-statistic that lies within the bounds makes the test inconclusive. 
In a second stage, once a long-run relationship has been established, a further two-
step procedure to estimate the model is carried out. First, the orders of the lags in the 
ARDL model are selected using an appropriate lag selection criterion, such as the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and the 
second step involves the estimation of the long-run relationship and the short-run 





6. Estimation results  
 
While the ARDL approach allows the estimation of a cointegrating vector with 
both I(1) and I(0) series, it is still important to exclude the possibility that any of the 
series are I(2). For this purpose, the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test was employed to identify the order of integration of the variables.  
 
Table II: Augmented  Dickey-Fuller unit root results 
Variable 
ADF test statistic 
(levels) 
ADF test statistic 
(first differences) 
I(d) 
LME -1.565 -5.280*** I(1) 
LGPD -1.341 -4.552 *** (b) I(1) 
LNME -0.083 -5.380 *** (b) I(1) 
LTRADE -3.298 * (b)  I(0) 
LPOP -3.856 ** (b)  I(0) 
LNATO -1.323 -4.913 *** (a) I(1) 
LUSA -2.156 (a) -4.253 *** I(1) 
Notes: 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is represented by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
(a) denotes the presence of a significant drift component but no trend term  
(b) indicates that both drift and trend components are significant 
Results obtained from EViews 5 
 
 
According to the results reported in Table II, there is evidence that the variables 
LME, LGDP, LNME, LNATO and LUSA are I(1), while the variables LTRADE and 
LPOP are I(0). It comes out of these results that the conditions for applying the ARDL 
cointegration approach are satisfied, i.e., none of the variables considered is I(2) or of 
greater order. It is worthwhile to mention that the mixture of both I(1) and I(0) variables 
would not be possible under the Johansen procedure. This gives a good reason for using 




The specified military expenditure demand function of equation can be written as 
the unrestricted error correction version of the ARDL model:  
                                                 
 4L     1+ 5       1+ 6      1+ =1  1        + =1 
 2         + =1  3         + =1  4           + =1  5 
        + =1  6          + =1  7          
                                    (11) 
In order to tests the long-run significance of the dependent variables the F-statistic 
test is computed. It tests the null hypothesis of non-existence of the long-run  
relationship  through  a  joint  testing  of  the  lagged level variables  in  the  unrestricted 
error  correction version of the ARDL specification. Given the few observations 
available, because the series in the sample are annual and the sample size is small, the 
maximum order of lag in the ARDL models is chosen to be 2. The bounds test for the 
existence of a level relationship is presented in Table III. 
 




Critical values bounds 
10% 5% 1% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
F(7, 23) = 3.32 7 2.03 3.13 2.32 3.5 2.96 4.26 
Notes:  
Critical values are obtained from Pesaran et al. (2001, p. 300) table CI case III 
k is the number of regressors 
Results obtained from Stata 12 
 
Using the asymptotic critical value bounds computed by Pesaran et al. (2001), the 
obtained F-statistic F(7, 23) = 3.32 is significant at the 10% level, regardless the order 
of integration (I(0) or I(1)). Therefore, the  null  hypotheses  of  no cointegration is 
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rejected implying the existence  of  a  long  run  relationship  between  the variables.  In 
other words, the vector of explanatory variables is relevant to explain the long-run 
dynamic of the Portuguese military expenditure. 
Having found a long-run relationship amongst the variables, the estimation of the 
long-run coefficients and the associated error correction model is carried out using the 
econometric software Microfit 4.0 developed by M.H. Pesaran  and B. Pesaran.  The 
optimal lag length for each variable is determined empirically by maximizing the 
Schwarz Bayesian criterion
10
. The selected ARDL regression based on SBC take the 
form of ARDL(2,0,1,0,0,0,0). 
  
Table IV: Estimated long-run coefficients  
Dependent variable LME 
  Coefficients t statistic 
Constant 55.229 3.854 
LGPD   0.787*** 4.485 
LNME  -0.115 -0.848 
LTRADE   0.315*** 2.565 
LPOP  -3.358*** -4.287 
LNATO  -0.562* -1.792 
LUSA   0.302*** 2.949 
WAR   0.199** 1.916 
PARTY   0.021 0.934 
D2010   0.452*** 5.824 
Notes: 
Significance levels: * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
Results obtained from Microfit 4.0 
                                                                
10
 Although the ARDL-AIC and the ARDL-SC estimators have very similar small-sample 
performances, there is a “slight superiority of the ARDL-SC over the ARDL-AIC procedure” according 
to Pesaran and Shin (1999, p. 404) 
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The long run coefficients of the regression in the ARDL approach are presented in 
Table IV and the short-run estimates of the error correction model (ECM) representation 
are given in Table V. 
 
Table V: Error correction representation (short-run estimates) 
Dependent variable ΔLME 
  Coefficients t statistic 
ΔLME(-1)   0.208***  3.090 
ΔLGPD   0.610***  3.955 
ΔLNME   0.224  1.449 
ΔLTRADE   0.244**  2.463 
ΔLPOP  -2.602*** -3.502 
ΔLNATO  -0.435* -1.676 
ΔLUSA   0.234**  2.644 
ΔWAR   0.155**  2.064 
ΔPARTY   0.016  0.941 
ΔD2010   0.350***  6.771 
Δconstant 42.794***  3.218 
ECM(-1)  -0.775***    -8.672 
R-Squared 0.86705 
F-Statistic F(11, 37) = 21.3429 [.000] 
DW-Statistic 2.0133 
Residual sum of squares 0.067112 
Notes: 
Significance levels: * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
Δ denotes the first difference 
ECM is the error correction term. 
 
 
The results suggest that the sign of the coefficient associated with each variable do 
not differ in the long and in the short-run, when the same is statistically significant. 
The economic growth plays a positive role on military expenditure so that the 
GDP coefficient comes out as statistically significant, giving support to the evidence 
that defence behaves as a normal good. 
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Albeit presenting contradictory signs in the long and in the short-run, the effects 
of non-military expenditure (NME) are non-significant. Thus there  is no evidence, as a 
negative coefficient would suggest, of a clear opportunity cost between the resources 
allocated to defence and the resources allocated to other functions of the state. 
The population variable POP presents a significant and negative coefficient 
suggesting that the public good effect of defence is verified.  
The impact of the economic openness variable TRADE on military expenditure is 
positive and statistically significant, although less significant in the long-run. This result 
is in agreement with the relationship hypothesised by Rosh (1988) that it is easier to an 
open country to access finance and markets for arms  purchase. 
As far as the allies‟ military expenditure is concerned, rather surprising results are 
obtained. By one hand, the effect of the NATO founding members military expenditure 
is negative and significant (although only at a 10% level) suggesting that Portugal may 
behave as a free-rider relatively to the NATO founding members excluding the United 
States. By another hand, the spill-in from the USA is positive and significant revealing 
that Portugal behaves as a United States follower. Moreover, and considering the US 
military expenditure as a proxy to measure the index of global instability, the observed 
impact of this variable may be understood as an active awareness of Portugal towards 
international security instability. 
As expected, the dummy variable for the Portuguese Colonial War has a positive 
and significant effect on the Portuguese military expenditure. For Portugal, as stated 
before, this variable presents an additional meaning since it incorporate the effect of the 
Estado Novo regime. Therefore, it is arguably to assume that the authoritarian regime 
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had a positive effect on military expenditure when compared to the democratic period 
established since 1974. 
The positive coefficient of PARTY, although not significant, hints at higher 
military spending by the right-wing governments than left-wing governments. The 
dummy variable D2010 presents, as expected, a positive and highly significant 
coefficient. 
Considering specifically the short run dynamics, it is shown that military 
expenditure is positively influenced by the previous year spending. This result is in 
agreement with the literature supporting the existence of an inertia effect in the military 
expenditure determination. In addition, the estimated coefficient of the error correction 
term is highly significant, thus confirming the previous results that there is a long-run 
relationship between the variables. Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient of the error correction term suggests a relatively high speed of adjustment to 








This dissertation contributes to the literature about the determinants of military 
expenditure in Portugal by estimating a comprehensive demand model that take into 
account the effect of economic, strategic and political environments. Using yearly data 
from 1960 to 2010 and employing an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach 
to cointegration, the results obtained yield a number of insights about variables that may 
affect the Portuguese military expenditure. 
The empirical results suggest that income is a prominent determinant with a 
positive effect on military expenditure. This result deserves particular attention as it 
contains important policy implications.  Thus, since the economic growth seems to 
plays an important role in determining the level of military expenditure, it is arguable 
that the present difficult economic situation of Portugal may pressure the defence 
budget and, therefore, constrain the country´s military capabilities.  
Moreover, there is no evidence of a clear opportunity cost between the resources 
allocated to defence and the resources allocated to other functions of the state. The 
public good effect of defence is evidenced by the significant and negative effect of 
population and there is strong evidence that economic openness has a significant 
positive effect.  
Considering the strategic and security environment, an interesting result was 
obtained relatively to the impact of the allies‟ military expenditure. It seems that 
Portugal behave as a „free-rider‟ regarding the effort of the NATO allies and as a 
„follower‟ of the United States. Unsurprisingly, the Portuguese Colonial War presents a 
very significant and positive effect.  
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As far as the domestic political environment is concerned, the transition to a 
democratic regime is considered a relevant determinant, with a negative effect, while 
the effect of the political ideology of the party in power appears to be insignificant. 
Apart from  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  associated  with  the  allies‟ military 
expenditure,  all  the  results  are aligned with the few previous studies considering the 
Portuguese case. 
As a time series analysis using yearly data from 1960 to 2010, this empirical work 
presents as a major limitation the small sample under analysis (t=51).  By one hand, it is 
obvious that a small sample compromise the results statistical significance. However, by 
another hand, it must be noticed that this study uses a larger sample when compared to 
the existing literature on the determinants of the Portuguese military expenditure. 
For a future research I would like to suggest two topics. First, considering the 
results obtained regarding the effect of allies‟ military expenditure on the Portuguese 
military expenditure, a further research would be important to understand the role of 
Portugal as an international security producer.  
A second research topic is about a matter that is in line with the theme of this 
dissertation. As the present work finds evidence about a significant impact from 
economic growth on military expenditure, it would be interesting to explore in future 
works the causality nexus between these two variables. Such a study could give especial 
attention to the period that become known as the „golden age‟ of the Portuguese 
economic growth, during the 1960´s and early 1970´s, in order to better understand the 
relationship between the tremendous war effort, due to the Portuguese Colonial War, 
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Figure 8: Microfit 4.0 output for the estimated long-run coefficients 
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Notes: 
The signs (+) or (−) indicate a positive or negative impact on military expenditure and the asterisk (*) marks the statistically significant variables. 
For the cases of ARDL estimations: LR = Estimated long-run coefficients and SR = Error correction representation (short-run estimates) 
The results of Nikolaidou, E. (2008) and Dunne, J. P., E. Nikolaidou, et al. (2003) here presented are exclusively for Portugal  
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